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LEGAL SHORTS
RECENT DECISIONS AFFECTING THE MONTANA
PRACTITIONER
STATE V. CARTER'
In Crawford v. Washington, the United States Supreme
Court overruled its prior decisions under the Confrontation
Clause and held out-of-court testimonial statements
inadmissible in criminal cases where the declarant is not
available at trial and the defendant did not have a prior
opportunity for cross-examination. 2 The Crawford Court also
held that such a constitutional prohibition does not apply to
nontestimonial statements sought to be admitted at a criminal
trial. 3 The Court chose not to provide a list of those statements
it considers testimonial versus nontestimonial. Rather, it only
stated that testimonial statements apply "at a minimum to prior
testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a
former trial; and to police interrogations."4  Outside these
limited areas, the Court left a determination of what constitutes
nontestimonial statements largely to the discretion of state
courts in analyzing its own hearsay law. 5
Thirteen months after the Crawford decision, the Montana
1. 2005 MT 87, 2005 WL 767164 (Apr. 5, 2005).
2. 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004); see also U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
3. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68.
4- Td.
5. Id.
1
et al.: Recent Decisions Affecting the Montana Practitioner
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 2005
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
Supreme Court issued its first guidance on how the court would
construe "testimonial" and "nontestimonial" statements in a
criminal trial in the case of State v. Carter. Carter was charged
and tried on three misdemeanor counts including driving while
under the influence of alcohol ("DUI").6 The State introduced
evidence concerning Carter's breath alcohol level at the time of
arrest, as well as three reports certifying that the device used to
measure his breath alcohol level was working properly at the
time the test was administered. 7 A deputy sheriff testified that
each of the reports showed the device to be operating within an
acceptable range, although the deputy had personally prepared
only one of the three reports.8 Carter objected to admitting two
of the three reports as hearsay due to the fact that the authors
of the reports were not present at trial to testify. 9 He also
argued that the State failed to establish the foundation
necessary for admission by showing that the author understood
how the device worked. 10  The trial court denied Carter's
objections and admitted both reports.11 Carter was ultimately
convicted by a jury of DUI and the two other misdemeanors
offenses. 12 He appealed to the Montana Supreme Court on the
ground that the admission of the reports violated his
confrontation rights under the Sixth Amendment pursuant to
Crawford and requested a new trial. 13
The majority opinion, written by Justice Nelson, first
analyzed whether Carter's Sixth Amendment arguments should
be considered as he had not raised them at trial. They
acknowledged the court's generally-established rule that it will
not consider arguments raised for the first time on appeal.1 4 In
deciding to rule on the argument, however, the majority cited
Cottrill v. Cottrill Sodding Service where it held:
[T]he general rule is that issues brought before this Court for the
first time on appeal will not be considered. [Citation omitted.]
However, this Court "reserves to itself the power to examine
6. Carter, 96.
7. Id. 7.
8. Id.
9. Id.98.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Carter, 6. One of the three misdemeanor charges was subsequently
dismissed. Id.
13. Id. 9, 12. Crawford had not been decided at the time Clark went to trial.
Id. T 12.
14. Id. $ 13.
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constitutional issues that involve broad public concerns to avoid
future litigation on a point of law." Even if an issue is raised for
the first time on anDeal this Court can hear the issue "if the
alleged ... error affects the substantial rights of a litigant.
15
The majority also cited several other cases where it had
departed from its established rule by hearing arguments for the
first time on appeal. 16 Based on its reasoning in Cottrill, the
majority found sufficient justification to hear Carter's
arguments as they raised a litigant's substantial right, and that
by doing so they could "avoid future litigation on the issue" and
address matters of "broad public concern."'17
Chief Justice Gray dissented from the majority's rationale,
objecting to how they strayed from the court's established rule.
She found little support in the cases cited by the majority,
especially in light of the fact that most of the decisions were in
civil, not criminal cases.' 8 She found one of the majority's
statements to be especially "frightening": "[I]t is evident that in
the same way which we are not bound to render decisions based
solely on the reasoning offered by appellate counsel, our review
is not necessarily restricted by trial counsel's failure to preserve
a specification of error for appeal."'19 Justice Gray suspected
that the court will see this statement raised by appellants "in
future cases when the Court does not wish to conduct itself
within any applicable parameters. '20
Having determined to proceed, the majority addressed
Carter's arguments under the Confrontation Clause which
provides: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him."21
The majority recognized the four specific pre-trial instances
considered to be testimonial in Crawford, as well as Crawford's
allowance for states to determine instances where in-court
statements are nontestimonial. 22
15. Id. 13 (quoting Cottrill, 229 Mont. 40, 42, 744 P.2d 895, 896 (1987)
(alterations in original).
16. Id. 7 14-16 (citing Kudrna v. Comet Corp., 175 Mont. 29, 572 P.2d 183 (1977);
State v. Hardy, 185 Mont. 130, 604 P.2d 792 (1980); Eastman v. Atlantic Richfield Co.,
237 Mont. 332, 777 P.2d 862 (1989); In the Petition to Transfer Territory, 2000 MT 342,
303 Mont. 204, 15 P.3d 447).
17. Id. 17.
18. Carter, 43 (Gray, C.J., dissenting).
19. Id. 14; see also Id. 47 (Gray, C.J., dissenting).
20. Id. 47 (Gray. C.,. dissenting).
21. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
22. Carter, 25.
2005
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Carter argued that the certification reports were testimonial
under Crawford as "they were created for use at trial" and, as
such, they should not have been admitted as the authors were
not available for cross-examination. 23 In addressing Carter's
arguments, the majority looked to two of its prior cases in
distinguishing between testimonial and foundational evidence. 24
In State v. Clark, the court reversed a lower court's
admission of a state crime laboratory report containing chemical
analysis of the defendant to prove the offense of criminal
possession of dangerous drugs without the testimony of the
report author.25 The court found the admission of the report to
be a violation of the defendant's right to confront witnesses
against him.i 6  In State v. Delaney, the court upheld the
admission of a certification report establishing that the device
used to measure a defendant's breath alcohol level was properly
operating without the testimony of the report author.27 The
Delaney court held that admitting the report without the
presence of its author was not a violation of the defendant's
confrontation right.28  It found that the certification report
"merely provided the foundation necessary for the admission of
substantive evidence."29
The Carter majority found a critical distinction between the
two cases in that the state crime laboratory report in Clark was
offered as substantive evidence to establish the commission of
the offense, while in Delaney the certification report was offered
to establish the foundation "necessary for the admission of
substantive evidence." 30 In short, the evidence in Delaney did
not have the same accusatory nature as that in Clark.31
Based upon the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Crawford to designate only four specific instances of testimonial
statements, as well as the Montana Supreme Court's own
rationale in Delaney, the Carter majority held "the certification
reports are nontestimonial in nature in that they are
23. Id. 7 26, 29.
24. Id. TT 27-28, 32 (citing State v. Delaney, 1999 MT 317, 297 Mont. 263, 991
P.2d 461; State v. Clark, 1998 MT 221, 290 Mont. 479, 964 P.2d 766).
25. Id. 28 (citing Clark, 7 24-25).
26. Id. (citing Clark, 25).
27. Id. 27 (citing Delaney, 10, 17).
28. Carter, 27 (citing Delaney, 18).
29. Id. 27 (citing Delaney, 18).
30. Id. T$ 28, 32.
31. Id. 28.
478 Vol. 66
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foundational, rather than substantive or accusatory," and did
not implicate Carter's right of confrontation under the Sixth
Amendment.32
Given the limited guidance provided by the Supreme Court
in Crawford, the Carter decision is likely the first of many
instances where the Montana Supreme Court will be asked to
rule on testimonial versus nontestimonial evidence. As the
Crawford decision ages, the Montana Supreme Court will not
need to determine whether to hear, or not to hear, a case based
upon whether a Crawford argument was raised at trial. As
recognized by Justice Gray, however, the statements made by
the Carter majority are likely to be repeated by appellants who
fail to raise arguments at trial, as well as critics of the court's
view of stare decisis.
-Thomas W. Korver
ORR V. STATE33
In Orr v. State, the Montana Supreme Court addressed
whether Article II, Section 18 of the 1972 Montana Constitution,
which abrogated sovereign immunity, applies to pre-July 1, 1973
breaches of duty by the State of Montana where the plaintiffs'
injuries do not manifest until after July 1, 1973.
The Plaintiffs/Appellants ("the Miners") were seven former
Libby miners, the wife of a former Libby miner, and a carpenter
who had worked at the Libby vermiculate mine. 34 Each of the
Miners had been diagnosed with asbestos-related disease. 35
Although the State of Montana had investigated the Libby mine
between 1956 and 1974 and found unsanitary and unhealthful
conditions each time, the State failed to enforce safe working
conditions at the mine and neglected to inform the Miners of its
findings. 36 The Miners sued W.R. Grace, the company that
owned and operated the Libby mine from 1963 to 1990, for
failing to provide a safe working environment.37 After Grace
filed for protection under Chapter 11 of the federal bankruptcy
laws in April 2001, effectively avoiding financial responsibility
32. Id. 32, 34.
33. 2004 MT 354, 324 Mont. 391, 106 P.3d 100. In Orr, the Montana Supreme
Court addressed four other issues not discussed in this article.
34. Id. 3.
35. Id. 1.
36. Id. 6.
37. Id. 4, 7.
2005 479
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for the claims, the Miners sued the State of Montana alleging
that it was negligent in failing ,to protect them. 38 The Miners
also alleged that the State was negligent in failing to inform
them and their families of, the: known dangers of the mine.39
This appeal followed the district court's ruling that the State did
not owe a duty to the Miners. 40
The issue that is the focus of this article is whether the
State was entitled to sovereign immunity, which would insulate
it from liability for its allegedly negligent acts.41 Although the
district court dismissed the case prior to ruling on this issue, the
Montana Supreme Court elected to address it in the interest of
judicial economy and resolution of the case. 42 Prior to 1972, the
Montana Constitution had neither authorized nor prohibited
sovereign immunity, 43 and Montana courts have applied
sovereign immunity in past cases.4 4  However, the 1972
Montana Constitution, which became effective on July 1, 1973,
eliminated sovereign immunity as a defense for state and local
governments. 45 The 1973 version of Article II, Section 18 stated,
"The state, counties, cities, towns, and all other local
governmental entities shall have no immunity from suit for
injury to a person or property. This provision shall apply only to
causes of action arising after July 1, 1973."46 In 1975, the last
sentence of the provision was deleted by voter initiative.47
The State argued that, because all but one of the State's
allegedly negligent acts occurred before July 1, 1973, it was
immune from liability by virtue of sovereign immunity.48  The
Miners, focusing on the elements of the tort of negligence, 49
responded that the "applicable sovereign immunity law is the
one in effect at the time their tort claim accrued."50 According to
38. Id. 7.
39. Orr, 8.
40. Id.
41. Id. 53-54.
42. Id. 7 53.
.43. Id. t 54.
44. Id. (citing Langford v. King, 1 Mont. 33, 38 (1868) (holding that citizens may
not sue the territorial government absent the government's consent)).
45. See MONT. CONST. art. II, § 18.
46. Orr, 54.
47. Id.
48. Id. 56.
49. The tort of negligence requires four elements: duty, breach of duty, causation,
and damages. See id.
50. Id.
480 Vol. 66
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the Miners, their claims had not accrued until their "damages"
became manifest in 1998, when they were diagnosed with
asbestos-related disease, long after sovereign immunity was
abrogated in Montana. 51 Thus, the Miners argued, the State
was not entitled to sovereign immunity.5 2
The court cited Jacques v. The Montana National Guard53
for the proposition that, when the elements of a tort are bisected
by the abrogation of sovereign immunity, the sovereign
immunity law in effect at the time of the injury applies.5 4 In
Jacques, the Montana National Guard was allegedly negligent
for discarding an artillery shell at an old firing range sometime
between 1956 and 1966, when sovereign immunity was in full
force and effect.5 5 In 1977, the plaintiffs co-worker found the
artillery shell at the firing range and showed it to the plaintiff
while he was working at the Anaconda Smelter in Anaconda,
Montana.5 6 The artillery shell subsequently exploded, injuring
the plaintiff.5 7  At issue was whether sovereign immunity
applied, limiting the State of Montana's exposure to the
insurance limits in effect as of 1963.58 The Montana Supreme
Court held that "[diamages are substantive and the measure of
damage is governed by [the] law in effect on the date of injury. ' 9
The court concluded that, because the plaintiffs injuries
occurred in 1977, after the abrogation of sovereign immunity,
sovereign immunity was not available as a defense to the
State. 60
After reviewing other jurisdictions for guidance on this
issue, 61 the court determined that the appropriate analysis was
to interpret the precise meaning of Article II, Section 18.62
According to the court, the critical phrase of the provision was
51. Id.
52. Orr, 56.
53. 199 Mont. 493, 649 P.2d 1319 (1982).
54. Orr, 57-58.
55. Jacques, 199 Mont. at 495-97, 649 P.2d at 1320-21.
56. Id., 199 Mont. at 495, 649 P.2d at 1320.
57. Id., 199 Mont. at 495, 649 P.2d at 1320.
58. Id., 199 Mont. at 505-06, 649 P.2d at 1326. See Section 40-4402, RCM (1963)
(waiving sovereign immunity where insurance is carried, but limiting such waiver to the
policy limit).
59. Jacques, 199 Mont. at 506-07, 649 P.2d at 1326.
60. Id., 199 Mont. at 507, 649 P.2d at 1326.
61. Orr, 60-68. See Carnes v. United States, 186 F.2d 648 (10th Cir. 1951);
Diminnie v- TLTnitd StntQ, 79 M F 9, 01 Ath C iavA.s,,dham . ..a Dept. of
Transp., 476 So. 2d 735 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
62. Orr, 68-69.
2005
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"suit for injury," which, under common usage of the words,
encompasses the Miners' claim.63 The court stated: "By the time
of the Constitutional Convention in 1972, one hundred years of
Montana jurisprudence stood for the proposition that a 'suit for
injury' could only be commenced upon an accrued cause of
action. ' 64 Thus, pursuant to Article II, Section 18, the State is
not entitled to sovereign immunity for causes of action accruing
after July 1, 1973.65
Next, the court addressed when the Miners' cause of action
had accrued. Prior to the adoption of the "discovery rule" in
Montana and many other jurisdictions, plaintiffs were often
barred from recovery because the breach of duty element was
linked with the statute of limitations. 66 A majority of states,
including Montana, have adopted the discovery rule, which
"allows injured plaintiffs to seek relief for long-dormant injuries
caused by tortious conduct that occurred much earlier. '" 67 After
analyzing Montana's discovery rule statute,68  the court
reasoned:
While Montana's statutory version of the discovery rule governs
the time within which an action must be commenced, its
provisions are nonetheless instructive on the question of when a
Montana cause of action accrues. A cause of action accrues 'when
all elements of the claim . . . exist or have occurred.' (citation
omitted) The causes of action of the surviving Miners did not
accrue until damage could be proven. And no damage could be
63. Id. T 69.
64. Id. 71 (citing Section 28, Laws of Montana, C. Civ. Proc. 1879; Section 470,
MCA, C. Civ. Proc. 1895; Section 6428, RCM (1907); Section 9011, RCM (1921); Section
9011, RCM (1935); Section 93-2401, RCM (1947); MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-1-102 (2003)).
65. Orr, 71.
66. Id. 73.
67. Id.
68. Id. 74-75. Montana's discovery rule statute provides:
For the purposes of statutes relating to the time within which an action must
be commenced:
(a) a claim or cause of action accrues when all elements of the claim or cause
exist or have occurred, the right to maintain an action on the claim or cause is
complete, and a court or other agency is authorized to accept jurisdiction of the
action;
(3) The period of limitation does not begin on any claim or cause of action for
an injury to person or property until the facts constituting the claim have been
discovered or, in the exercise of due diligence, should have been discovered by
the injured party if:
(a) the facts constituting the claim are by their nature concealed or self-
concealing;
MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-2-102 (2003).
8
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proven until their injuries were manifest.6 9
The court cited two Pennsylvania cases 70 for the proposition that
"the discovery rule as announced in the statute of limitations'
context, should apply as well in a sovereign immunity
analysis."7' Applying the foregoing reasoning, the court held
that "[a] 'suit for injury' accrues once the elements of the cause
of action have accrued." 72 Examining the record, the court noted
that the Miners did not appear to have exhibited symptoms of
asbestos-related disease as early as 1973. 73 Since the elements
of the Miners' causes of action did not accrue until after
sovereign immunity was abrogated, that is, their asbestos-
related symptoms or "damages" were not present until after July
1, 1973, sovereign immunity did not insulate the State from the
Miners' cause of action.74
In his dissent, Justice Warner criticized the majority for
mischaracterizing sovereign immunity as a bar to suits against
the government.7 5  According to Justice Warner, sovereign
immunity is "a legal doctrine to the effect that actions or
omissions of the government do not constitute a breach of duty
owed to its citizens."76 Thus, at the time of the State's allegedly
negligent acts, the State owed no duty at all to the Miners and,
consequently, they had no cause of action against the State.
77
Justice Warner also argued that the majority erroneously
inferred that the delegates of the 1972 Constitutional
Convention intended for Article II, Section 18 to apply to claims
that accrue after July 1, 1973.78 He concluded that Article II,
Section 18 created a right to sue the State, and that right only
applies prospectively from July 1, 1973. 79
As a result of Orr, plaintiffs with latent injuries or illnesses
may sue the State of Montana or local government for pre-1973
breaches of duty where their symptoms or damages become
manifest after July 1, 1973. Orr is significant because these
69. Orr, 1 76.
70. Id. 7 77-79. See Hurst v. East Hanover Township, 33 Pa. D. & C.3d 157 (Pa.
Com. P1. 1984); Hench v. Carpenter, 35 Pa. D. & C.3d 401 (Pa. Com. P1. 1985).
71. Orr, 7 77.
72. Id. 80.
73. Id. 1 72.
74. Id. 80.
75. Id. 86 (Warner, J., dissenting).
76. Id. 87 (Warner, J., dissenting).
''7 OrC 5 (AT- , _T .
78. Id. 96 (Warner, J., dissenting).
79. Id. 77 99, 103 (Warner, J., dissenting).
4832005
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suits would have otherwise been barred by sovereign immunity
had their damages accrued prior to the adoption of the 1972
Montana Constitution.
-Mark J. Luebeck
DEMPSEY V. ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY8 °
In Dempsey v. Allstate Insurance Co., the Montana Supreme
Court accepted the following certified question from the United
States District Court for the District of Montana: "Does the
Montana Supreme Court's decision in Hardy v. Progressive
Specialty Insurance Co. apply prospectively only, or does it apply
retroactively to require payment of stacked uninsured,
underinsured motorist and medical payment insurance
coverages in qualifying circumstances on claims arising before
the date of the Hardy decision?"8' In answering the question,
the Montana Supreme Court concluded that'its prior'decision in
Hardy v. Progressive Specialty Insurance Co. applies
retroactively to cases "pending on direct review or not yet
final."8 2
On January 1, 2000, Tyler Dempsey was injured in a car
accident in Gallatin County, Montana and incurred medical
expenses in excess of $10,000.O.83 Dempsey was insured
through Allstate Insurance Company.8 4 His insurance policy
limited his medical payments coverage to $2,000 for each of the
four vehicles listed on the policy.8 5 In light of the anti-stacking
provisions in Dempsey's insurance policy and Montana's anti-
stacking statute in effect at the time of Dempsey's accident,
Allstate paid one limit of liability in the amount of $2,000 for
Dempsey's medical expenses.8 6 Allstate refused to stack the
medical payments coverage for th other vehicles listed on the
insurance policy.87
80. 2004 MT 391, 325 Mont. 207, 104 P.3d 483.
81. Dempsey, 11.
82. Id. TT 4, 31, 37.
83. Id. IT 6-7.
84. Id. 6.
85. Id.
86. Id. 7.
87. Dempsey, 7. Montana Code Annotated section 33-23-203 (2003), in effect at
the time of Dempsey's motor vehicle accident, provides:
(1) Unless a motor vehicle liability policy specifically provides otherwise, the
limits of insurance coverage available under each part of the policy must be
determined as follows, regardless of the number of motor vehicles insured
under the policy, the number of policies issued by the same company covering
Vol. 66
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On April 18, 2003, the Montana Supreme Court decided the
case of Hardy v. Progressive Specialty Insurance Co. 88 In Hardy,
the court concluded that anti-stacking provisions in an
automobile insurance policy were void and Montana's anti-
stacking provision was unconstitutional.8 9 Thereafter, the court
instructed the insurance company to pay underinsured motorist
coverage "for each coverage for which the insured had paid a
separate premium."90
In light of the Hardy decision, Dempsey and other plaintiffs
similarly situated instituted a class action to force Allstate to
stack medical payments, underinsured motorist, and uninsured
motorist coverages for all claims arising before the Hardy
decision. 91 In response, Allstate argued that the court's decision
in Hardy applied prospectively only.92 As a result, Allstate
refused to stack medical payments, uninsured motorist, and
underinsured motorist coverages for cases arising before the
the insured, or the number of separate premiums paid:
(a) the limits of insurance coverages available for any one accident are the
limits specified for each coverage available under the policy insuring the
motor vehicle involved in the accident;
(b) if the motor vehicle involved in the accident is not insured under a
policy, the limits of the insurance coverages available for any one accident
are the highest limits of the coverages specified under one policy for one
motor vehicle insured under that policy; and
(c) the limits of the coverages specified under one policy or under more
than one policy issued by the same company may not be added together to
determine the limits of insurance coverages available under the policy or
policies for any one accident.
(2) A motor vehicle liability policy may. also provide for other reasonable
limitations, exclusions, reductions of coverage, or subrogation clauses that
are design6d to prevent duplicate payments for the same element of loss
under the motor vehicle liability policy or under another casualty policy
that provides coverage for an injury that necessitates damages or benefit
payments or to prevent the adding together of insurance coverage limits
in one policy or from more than one policy issued by the same company.
(3) An insurer that charges a premium for a specified coverage shall
clearly inform or notify the insured in writing of the limits of the coverage
with respect to the premium charged and whether the coverage from one
policy or motor vehicle may be added to the coverage of another policy or
motor vehicle.
(4) Nothing in this section is intended to create coverage for a motor
vehicle that would otherwise be uninsured.
88. 2003 MT 85, 315 Mont. 107, 67 P.3d 892.
89. Dempsey, 8.
90. Id.
91. Id. 9.
92. Id.
11
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Hardy decision. 93
The United States District Court for the District of
Montana, the Honorable Sam E. Haddon, certified the question
of whether the court's prior decision in Hardy applies
retroactively in certain circumstances on claims arising before
the Hardy decision.94 Beginning its analysis, the court first
discussed the rule of retroactivity in Montana. 95 The court
provided a brief history of retroactivity and noted that the
retroactive and prospective distinctions are relatively recent
distinctions in our jurisprudence.96 As discussed by the court,
during the time of Blackstone, judges existed to apply the old
law and ruled on the law "as it is and always was."97 Today, the
retroactive and prospective distinction exists in our climate of
legal realism.98
In reaching its conclusion, the court chronicled the
development of the law of retroactivity in the United States
Supreme Court and the Montana Supreme Court. The court
first recalled that, in 1971, the United States Supreme Court
decided the case of Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson.99 In Chevron, the
Court outlined a three-part test to determine whether a decision
applies nonretroactively in the context of criminal appeals.100
First, the decision must announce a new principle of law by
overruling past precedent or by deciding an issue of first
impression "whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed."' 10 1
Second, the court must review the history of the rule and decide
whether applying the rule retrospectively will further the rule's
operation.102 Lastly, the court must weight the inequity
associated with a retrospective application of the decision.103
Therefore, in light of Chevron, ". . . the federal courts had
flexibility to grant nonretroactive relief to litigants who had
justifiably relied on old rules of law when there was no
93. Id.
94. Dempsey, 1-3.
95. Id. 12-13.
96. Id. 16-17.
97. Id. 16 (citing Kermit Roosevelt III, A Little Theory is a Dangerous Thing:
The Myth of Adjudicative Retroactivity, 31 CONN. L. REV. 1075 (1999)).
98. Id. 17.
99. Id. 12 (citing Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 (1971)).
100. Dempsey, 12.
101. Id. 21.
102. Id.
103. Id.
486 Vol. 66
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indication that the rule would change." 104  The Montana
Supreme Court formally adopted the Chevron three part test in
the case of LaRoque v. State.10 5
Next, the court noted that, in 1987, the United States
Supreme Court decided the case of Griffith v. Kentucky. 10 6 In
Griffith, the Court adopted a new rule regarding retroactivity
and declared that "criminal decisions apply retroactively to all
cases 'pending on direct review or not yet final."'10 7
Subsequently, in 1993, the United States Supreme Court
expressly overruled Chevron in the case of Harper v. Virginia
Department of Taxation.108 In Harper, the Court applied the
rule of retroactivity to civil cases.10 9 In doing so, the Court
concluded that rules stemming from interpretations of federal
law must be applied retroactively to cases pending on direct
review.110
Thereafter, the Montana Supreme Court decided the case of
Porter v. Galarneau'1 1 and noted its continued support of
retroactivity as outlined in the United States Supreme Court's
Harper case.11 2 However, in other subsequent decisions, instead
of following the Court's Harper line of cases, the Montana
Supreme Court used the Chevron test to determine whether a
decision applied prospectively or not.1 13
In Dempsey, the Montana Supreme Court clarified the
merits of prior decisions regarding the rule of retroactivity.
First, the court reaffirmed its general rule that judicial decisions
are given retroactive effect. 114 Second, the court noted it may
apply a new rule of law prospectively in "compelling case[s]."'115
Third, the court stated that the Chevron test is still a valid
exception to the rule of retroactivity when all three factors of the
Chevron test are satisfied. 116 Therefore, the court concluded
104. Id. 21.
105. Id. 12 (citing LaRoque v. State, 178 Mont. 315, 318-19, 583 P.2d 1059, 1061
(1978)).
106. Dempsey, 22. (citing Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 315 (1987)).
107. Dempsey, 22 (citing Griffith, 479 U.S. at 328).
108. Id. 12 (citing Harper v. Va. Dep't of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86 (1993)).
109. Id. 23.
110. Id.
111. 275 Mont. 174, 911 P.2d 1143 (1996).
112. Dempsey, 13.
113. Id. 14.
114. Id. 2 ".
115. Id.
116. Id. 30.
2005 487
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that all civil decisions apply retroactively to cases "pending on
direct review or not yet final, unless all three of the Chevron
factors are satisfied."117
After the court outlined and clarified its test regarding the
rule of retroactivity, the court questioned whether the Hardy
case satisfied all three factors from the Chevron case. 118 The
court concluded that the rule of law derived from the Hardy case
does not satisfy all three factors of the Chevron test. 119 The first
Chevron test factor is whether "the decision to be applied
nonretroactively ... establish[es] a new principle of law, either
by overruling clear past precedent on which litigants may have
relied or by deciding an issue of first impression whose
resolution was not clearly foreshadowed."1 20 In its decisions
before Hardy, the court discouraged anti-stacking provisions and
allowed stacking of insurance coverages in numerous cases. 1 1
Therefore, the court concluded that it did not overrule "clear
past precedent" and the decision in Hardy does not satisfy all
factors of the Chevron test.12 2 The court declined to address the
remaining two Chevron factors since the first factor was
unsatisfied. 123
In its conclusion, the court announced that Hardy applies
retroactively to "open claims arising before its issuance.' 24
Additionally, the; court limited retroactivity to cases "pending on
direct review or not yet final." 25
-J. Winston Irwin
STATE V. ANYAN 126
Montana v. Anyan presents an issue of first impression in
Montana: Whether law enforcement officers' no-knock entry into
Appellants' house to execute a search warrant violated
Appellants' constitutional right to privacy and freedom from
unreasonable searches and seizures. 127 The court answers this
117. Id. 731.
118. Dempsey, 32.
119. Id.
120. Id. 33.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Dempsey, 37.
125. Id.
126. 2004 MT 395, 104 P.3d 511, 325 Mont. 245.
127. Id. 19-20.
Vol. 66488
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question affirmatively, and, in so doing, establishes both a
presumption of the invalidity of no-knock entries and a
framework in which to assess their constitutionality.
Officer Christopher Nichols of the Thompson Falls Police
Department suspected the illegal operation of a clandestine
methamphetamine lab at a rented house in Thompson Falls,
Montana. 128  Before obtaining a warrant, Officer Nichols
consulted various SWAT team leaders on the logistics of serving
a warrant. 129 Later, in his warrant application, Officer Nichols
related that he saw "out of the ordinary traffic" coming and
going from the residence, and that a disproportionate number of
vehicles possessed Washington license plates. 30 One of the
plates led Officer Nichols to discover that Troy Klein, an
Appellant/resident, had prior drug offense charges, and that
Klein also had three active felony warrants and a warrant for
his arrest in connection with a nonviolent felony parole
violation.1 31  Several other individuals associated with the
residence also had histories of drug related offenses, and
another individual had felony convictions for burglary and child
rape. 132 Officer Nichols also noted the presence of a surveillance
camera that appeared to scan the driveway.' 33
Nowhere in the application did Officer Nichols specifically
identify those exigent circumstances that might justify a no-
knock entry.134  Although not included in the warrant
application, Officer Nichols did note that an individual matching
Troy Klein's description purchased ammunition from a local
hardware store. 135  However, a two-and-a-half month
investigation yielded no observation or reports of weapons
sighted in the residence or in possession of any individuals
associated with it.136
128. Id. 3.
129. Id.
130. Id. 4.
131. Id. 77 4, 6.
132. Anyan, $ 5.
133. Id.
134. Id. T 35. The court noted that exigent circumstances are "those circumstances
that would cause a reasonable person to believe that entry (or other relevant prompt
action) was necessary to prevent physical harm to the officers or other persons, the
destruction of relevant evidence, the escape of a suspect, or some other consequence
improperly frustrating legitimate law enforcement efforts." Id. T 34 (citing U.S. v.
Zermeno. 66 F.3d 1058, 1063 (9th Cir. 1995)).
135. Id. T 6.
136. Id.
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On the night of July 25, 2000, two SWAT teams assembled
in Thompson Falls to prepare for the pending search of the
residence. 137  Officer Nichols and two SWAT team leaders,
Sergeant Bardwell and Undersheriff Chuck Curry, discussed the
logistics of executing the search warrant, including whether the
officers should knock and announce their presence and purpose
before entering. 138 They determined that the SWAT teams
would enter the residence at 4:00 am, without knocking and
announcing. 139
Prior to the 4:00 am target time, surveillance of the
residence revealed that an occupant "yelled at everyone to get
inside and turn off the lights."'140 Later observations showed
that the occupants were preparing to retire for the night, but the
officers decided to accelerate their timetable and executed a no-
knock raid at 3:00 am. 141  As the officers approached the
residence outside the range of the surveillance camera, they
observed that the lights were off, that they neither saw nor
heard anything suggestive of attempts to escape or resist arrest,
that there was no indication that the occupants detected their
presence or anticipated the raid, and that there was no
indication that the residence was barricaded or booby-
trapped.142 One group of officers entered the top floor by using a
steel ram to break the door jam, confronting various occupants
in various stages of sleep or sleep preparation. 143 Another group
of officers entered the residence through the downstairs kitchen
door.' 44  None of the officers knocked or announced their
presence prior to entering the residence. 145
The State of Montana charged Appellants with conspiracy
to manufacture dangerous drugs, criminal production or
manufacture of dangerous drugs, criminal possession of
dangerous drugs, and possession of dangerous drugs with intent
to sell.146  Each Appellant filed a motion to suppress the
evidence seized during the raid, based in part on the officers'
137. Anyan, 7.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. 7 8.
141. Id. 7 8-9.
142. Id. 9.
143. Anyan, T 10.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. 7 12.
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failure to knock and announce their presence prior to entering
the residence to execute the search warrant. 147 The District
Court denied Appellants' motion to suppress, determining that it
was reasonable for law enforcement officers to believe that
knocking and announcing would be either dangerous, futile, or
that it would inhibit effective investigation by permitting
evidentiary destruction. 148
In analyzing the circumstances presented by Anyan and
whether a no-knock entry was appropriate to the case, the
Montana Supreme Court first discussed the well-known
language of the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, which protects "[tlhe right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures. '149 When police officers
execute a search warrant at a citizen's residence, "[tihe knock
and announce rule recognizes the powerful protection afforded
by the Fourth Amendment to the sanctity of the home."150 These
concerns are further heightened by the greater protections
afforded by the Montana Constitution, 151 as well as by concerns
about the reduction in the potential for violence, and the
prevention of the destruction of private property.152
Additionally, the court opined that the knock and announce rule
is "embedded in Anglo-American law," and has been relied upon
by residents throughout the common law's evolution. 153
However, the court also recognized that the knock and
announce rule permits flexibility, and not every entry must be
preceded by an announcement. 15 4 An officer must comply with
the knock and announce requirement unless exigent
circumstances are present. Such exigencies justifying no-knock
entry must result from an officer's reasonable suspicion that
"knocking and announcing their presence, under the particular
circumstances, would be [1] dangerous [to the safety of officers
or others,] or [2] futile, or [3] that it would inhibit effective
investigation of the crime by, for example, allowing the
147. Id.
148. Id. 17.
149. U.S. CONST. amend IV.
150. Anyan, 21.
151. Id. 20 (citing MONT. CONST. art. II, §§ 10, 11).
152. Id. 22.
153. Id. 7 30-31 (quoting Wilson v. Ark., 514 U.S. 927, 934 (1995)).
154. Id. 32. (citing Wilson, 514 U.S. at 934).
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destruction of evidence." 15 5 Two types of exigencies exist: (1)
those that are foreknown and (2) those unexpected exigencies
that arise on the scene. 156 Determinations of reasonableness
consider these distinct circumstances. 157  An unjustified yet
sincere belief in the presence of exigent circumstances is
insufficient to justify non-compliance with the knock and
announce rule. 158 Instead, the government must prove that
exigent circumstances existed at the time of entry. 159 Similarly,
there is no blanket exception to the knock and announce rule in
felony drug investigations, as mere unspecific fears about
possible evidentiary destruction or violence will not suffice to
permit non-compliance. 60
Danger or safety concerns cannot be predicated upon
general or unspecific fears.16' Instead, "It]here must be specific
information to lead the officers to a reasonable conclusion that
the presence of firearms raises concerns for officers' safety."'16 2
Consequently, the court stated that a concern for officer safety
"must be based upon prior knowledge or direct observation that
the subject of a search keeps weapons and that such person has
a known propensity to use them."'6 3
Here, the court concluded that no information existed
suggesting any of the occupants possessed weapons or a
propensity for their use. 164  Although Klein's description
matched the purchaser of ammunition, months of surveillance
uncovered no information of weapons located in the residence,
no reports of occupants possessing weapons, no evidence that
the occupants were prone to violence or the use of weapons, nor
that any threats were made against law enforcement. 65
Although later investigation revealed that certain occupants
possessed criminal backgrounds involving violent, offenses, the
court commented that this information could not validate the
no-knock entry in this case :as a court may only concern itself
"with what the officers had reason to believe at the time of their
155. Id. 34, 39 (citing Richards v. Wis.. 520 U.S. 385, 394-95 (1997)).
156. Anyan, 35 (citing U.S. v. Dupras, 980 F.Supp 344, 347 (D. Mont. 1997)).
157. Id.
158. Id. 34 (citing U.S. v. Mendonsa, 989 F.2d 366, 370 (9th Cir. 1993)).
159. Id. 34.
160. Id. 36 (citing Richards, 520 U.S. at 394-95).
161. Id. 43.
162. Anyan, 44 (citing U.S. v. Moore, 91 F.3d 96, 98 (10th Cir. 1996)).
163. Id.
164. Id. 45.
165. Id.
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entry."166
The Montana Supreme Court also discussed the "futility
exception" to the knock and announce rule. Futility excuses the
knock and announce requirement "where police officers have a
reasonable suspicion that the occupants know of the presence
and. purpose of the police prior to their entry into the
residence." 167 As noted by the United States Court of Appeals
for the-Ninth Circuit, "[j]ust as one cannot close a door that is
already closed, one cannot 'announce' a presence that is already
known."168 Here, the court reasoned that even if the occupants
were aware, via the surveillance camera, of the approaching
officers, this would not necessarily constitute exigent
circumstances relieving officers of their knock and announce
responsibility. 169 Because there was no evidence indicating the
occupants of the residence were aware of the officers' presence,
the State conceded the inapplicability of the futility exception,
and the court agreed. 70
Finally, the court analyzed whether the possibility of
destruction of evidence may constitute an exigent circumstance
justifying a no-knock entry.17' But, in meeting this exigency, the
State would have to demonstrate "a reasonable belief that the
loss or destruction of evidence was imminent."'172 The mere
possibility or suspicion of evidentiary destruction when
occupants are faced with a search is insufficient to create an
exigency. 173  In considering the possibility of evidence
destruction, the court noted that an inverse relationship exists
in drug investigations: "[t]he larger the amount of drugs and the
more complex the operation, the less likelihood there is that
evidence will be destroyed between the knock and announce and
the subsequent entry."'174 Here, the mere fact that the residence
contained a methamphetami-ne lab failed to justify a no-knock
entry. 75 Not only was the potential destruction of the lab not a
166. Id. 47 (quoting U.S. v. Ramirez, 523 U.S. 65, 71, n. 2 (1998)).
167. Id. 51 (citing U.S. v. Bates, 84 F.3d 790, 795 (6th Cir. 1996), and U.S. v.
Dunnock, 295 F.3d 431, 435 (4th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1037 (2002)).
168. Anyan, 53 (quoting U.S. v. Peterson, 353 F.3d 1045, 1049 (9th Cir. 2003)
(emphasis removed).
169. Id. 57 (citing with approval Ill. v. Condon, 592 N.E.2d 951, 956 (1992)).
170. Id. 55.
171. Id. 77 58-60.
172. Id. 58 (quoting United States v. Bates, 84 F.3d, 790, 796 (6th Cir. 1996)).
173. Id.
174. Anyan, 59 (citing U.S. v. Tavares, 223 F.3d 911, 917 (8th Cir. 2000)).
175. Id. 60.
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consideration in the officers' risk assessment of a no-knock
entry, but such a lab cannot be destroyed in the interval
between knocking and entering. 176
Based on these considerations of the officers' failure to
knock and announce before executing the search warrant and
the absence of exigent circumstances, the Montana Supreme
Court held that the forced entry into the Appellants' residence
and subsequent search was unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution and under Article
II, Sections 10 and 11 of the Montana Constitution. 177 However,
the court continued with an elaboration of its knock and
announce jurisprudence. Generally, "the decision to make a no-
knock entry should ordinarily be made by a neutral and
detached magistrate as part of the application for search
warrant."178  This "ensures that a neutral and detached
evaluation of the situation is interposed between the
investigating officer and the private citizen."1 79 Thus, the court
concluded, when officers consider a no-knock entry, "that
intention must be included in the application for the search
warrant along with any foreknown exigent circumstances."'80
However, an officer may make the decision to execute a no-
knock entry absent judicial interposition "based on unexpected
exigent circumstances that arise on the scene."18'
State v. Anyan provides Montana criminal law practitioners
with clear notice that the Montana Supreme Court considers the
knock and announce rule one that can be contravened only by
exigent circumstances clearly outlined in a search warrant
application or reasonably supported by exigencies that officers
can articulate as being directly related to officer safety, futility,
imminent destruction of evidence, or the frustration of some
other legitimate law enforcement effort.
-Christopher S. Stoneback
176. Id.
177. Id. 62.
178. Id. 63.
179. Id.
180. Anyan, 63 (emphasis added).
181. Id.
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